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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT BOWL COMPANY, a UTAH 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a Civil action to recover damages resulting 
from a termination of a lease agreement between the 
Respondent, Salt Bowl Company, as Lessee, and the State 
of Utah as Lessor. It is the contention of the Respondent 
Lessee that the termination of the lease was unjustified 
under the facts and circumstances, resulting in the dam-
ages claimed by the Respondent. The case was tried in 
two parts without a jury. The first on the question of 
liability and the second part on the question of damages. 
Case No. 
13847 
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DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
The Trial Court found that the Respondent was en-
titled to damages caused by the wrongful termination 
by the Appellant of the lease agreement between the 
parties, but Mmited the Respondent's damages to a period 
between the wrongful termination and a subsequent in-
vitation of the Attorney General's office to return to the 
lease premises for a "trial" which invitation was declined 
by the Respondent for reasons hereinafter argued. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Appellant seeks a reversal of the Court's finding 
of liability on the part of the State of Utah and a finding 
of justification for its acts in terminating the lease. The 
Respondent cross appeals contending that the damages 
awarded by the Trial Court, based on a theory of miti-
gation, were insufficient as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent, Salt Bowl Company, must respect-
fully controvert the Statement of Facts as set forth in 
the Appellant's Brief, which it is submitted, is more a 
legal argument concerning the interpretation of Respon-
dent's lease than a statement of facts. 
Respondent has operated automobile races and shows 
since 1951, and since 1953 to the termination of its 
lease by the Appellant in May 1973, operated these races 
under various arrangements with the State of Utah at 
the Utah State Fairgrounds (Tr. 97, Ln. 8-15). As a 
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continuajtaon of this relationship, the Appellant as Lessor 
and the Respondent as Lessee entered into a five year 
lease agreement on October 11, 1967 (Ex. P-l, R-32, Tr. 
20). The lease was for a period commencing May 1,1968, 
to May 1, 1973. Under the lease agreement the Respon-
dent was required to make substantial improvements to 
the premises in a minimum amount of $15,000.00 (Ex. 
P-l paragraph 12, page 4), during an initial five year 
term. Further, the Lease Agreement contained an ex-
clusive option to renew the Lease Agreement for an ad-
ditional term of five years, by the Respondent giving 
notice of his intention to do so prior to the expiration 
of the original term (Ex. P-l, paragraph 18, page 8, 9). 
The Lease Agreement granted the Respondent the right 
to use the premises, not only for "auto racing" as stated 
by Appellant, but (Ex. P-l, paragraph 1, page 2): 
"To have the exclusive right to promote and con-
duct motor vehicle races, exhibitions and thrill 
shows for public admission, together with such 
other related activities, including advertising, as 
may be reasonably connected with or incidental 
to the foregoing." (Emphasis added.) 
During the original term of the lease, the Respondent 
made the agreed improvements (Tr. 98, Ln. 21-23), and 
on approximately April 24, 1973, the Respondent served 
upon the Appellant its notice of intention to renew the 
lease, and requested that it be furnished an acknowledged 
copy (Tr. 99, Ln. 2-13). On May 10, 1973, the Appellant 
by its Director of Expositions, Mr. Hugh C. Bringhurst, 
advised the Respondent the lease would not be renewed, 
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notwithstanding the Respondent's timely notice of re-
newal. Mr. Bringhurst testified that the May 10th No-
tice of Violation was drawn at the direction of Mr. Frank 
Nelson of the Appellant's Attorney General's Office (Tr. 
126, Ln. 24-28). Mr. Bringhurst also stated that he per-
sonally knew of no reason for the cancellation (Tr. 127, 
Ln. 26-30). Two days later on May 12, 1973, the Appel-
lant served upon the Respondent, a second notice of 
cancellation (Ex. P-4). This second notice cited as the 
reason for the Appellant's action an alleged violation of 
the Lease Agreement on the previous September 6, 1972, 
over eight months prior to the serving of the same, and 
further advised the Respondent that (Ex. P-4): 
"Said termination to be effective on the 6th day 
after service of this notice since there is no way 
in which the said violation can be corrected with-
in the said period of time." (Emphasis added.) 
Pursuant to the two notices served upon the Re-
spondent it advised the various parties involved, the 
Drivers Association, the Public Relations Office, the 
Advertising Agency, of the Respondent's action and the 
cancellation of the lease (Tr. 103, Ln. 24-104, Ln. 2). On 
June 8, 1973, the Respondent filed a claim for damages 
with the Appellant (R. 68), and immediately thereafter, 
on June 11, 1973, the Respondent, by Robert B. Hansen, 
Deputy Attorney General, advised the Respondent by 
letter (Ex. D-10), inter alia, 
"We propose that you conduct a race and see 
whether you are correct." (Emphasis added.) 
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The Respondent replied that it would reinstate its racing 
program for the summer if the Appellant in turn would 
reinstate the contract of the Respondent, which Respon-
dent, then as now, contended had been wrongfully can-
celled. Mr. Papwoorth, President of the Respondent, 
stated the Respondent's position (Tr. Il l , Ln. 7-13): 
"A. They would not reinstate it. I believe they 
were talking about letting me go out and see 
what I could do, and then they would give me a 
new contract, but that was not my position. My 
position was that I had a contract, that I hadn't 
violated it. They terminated it. They should 
have — if they felt there was something wrong, 
they should reinstate it, withdraw their term-
ination." 
And again stating the position of the Respondent 
(Tr. I l l , Ln. 28): 
"A. All they had to do was withdraw their 
notice of violation, and I would have a valid 
contract, and I would go out and race and take 
my changes on living within any laws that any-
body had." 
Appellant's continued refusal to honor the Respondent's 
contract according to its terms gave rise to the present 
litigation and the Respondent's claim for damages. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AFTER FINDING THAT THE RACE CON-
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DUCTED ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1972 WAS IN 
VIOLATION OF 32-9-3, REVISED ORDIN-
ANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, THE COURT 
ERRED IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT VIO-
LATION WAS A LEGALLY JUSTIFIABLE 
GROUNDS FOR SERVICE "notice of viola-
tion" ON RESPONDENT, SALT BOWL COM-
PANY. 
The Appellant opens its argument concerning this 
point with the statement that "the Court found that the 
race conducted on September 6, 1972, was in violation 
of a Salt Lake City "Noise Control Ordinance". Appel-
lant cites as a "finding of fact," a colloquy between the 
Court and Counsel at the conclusion of which the Court 
went on to state, (Tr. 192, Ln. 29, 193, Ln. 4). 
"Under the Lease Agreement I would have to 
find the notice of violation dated May 11th was 
ineffective and find that the — that's 1973 — 
and would also have to find that the Plaintiff Is 
notice of renewal of the lease is effective and find 
that the lease has been valid since May 1, 1973." 
A reading of the record concerning the Court's com-
ments in this regard will show that the quoted statement 
was in no way a "Finding of Fact" in the accepted sense 
and the Findings entered by the Court do not include 
any such Finding. As the Court stated in the course 
of the same conversation, "I can't see that it makes any 
difference" (Tr. 192, Ln. 23-24). ! 
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As the argument ol this point is based on the Ap-
pellant's insistance that its primary concern was that the 
Respondent had violated a Salt Lake City Ordinance, 
Respondent submits that it is appropriate to demonstrate 
by the Appellant's own witnesses how basically specious 
this argument is. 
In fact the testimony of the state's witnesses demon-
strates that the decision had been made to cancel and 
dishonor the Respondent's lease before the Appellant was 
even aware of the claimed violation and that this claim is 
a complete afterthought 
The Lease Agreement, Exhibit P-l, was arrived at 
af tor the Respondent had been a tenant of the Appellant 
for approximately fifteen (15) years, contemplated sub-
stantial improvements to be made at the expense of the 
Respondent Lessee, and was entered into alter extended 
review, consideration and public hearings (Tr. 122, Ln. 
15 to Tr. 123, Ln. 22 and Ex. 14-P to 20-P inclusive). 
Alter providing (Ex. P-l ar. 9, page 4) that the "Lessee 
shall comply with all federal, state and local laws" the 
lease goes on (Ex. P-l, Par. 13, page 6). 
"It is expressly understood and agreed that in 
the event Lessee's activities upon the leased 
premises are determined by any Court having 
jurisdiction to be unlawful or to constitute a 
public nuisance, whether in litigation commenced 
by anyone, then and in such event, this lease 
agreement shall be terminated forthwith, and the 
obligations of both parties hereunder shall be im-
mediately avoided and suspended." (Emphasis 
added.) 
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In the context in which the lease was entered into, con-
templating as it did substantial investment by the Re-
spondent, it is apparent that the panties contemplated 
that the Respondent would have the protection of due 
process of law in defending any claimed violation of any 
such laws. Obviously the Office of the Attorney General 
is not a "Court having jurisdiction", and it was precisely 
the type of arbitrary and capricious action that was sub-
sequently taken by the Appellant, that the Respondent 
sought to avoid by the cited provision of its lease. Neither 
Mr. Papworth nor the Respondent, Salt Bowl Company, 
have ever been charged with or convicted of any violation 
of any federal, state or local law. See inter alia the testi-
mony of Mr. Frank Nelson of the Office of the Attorney 
General (Tr. 147, Ln. 6-10) where he stated: 
"Q. But you — now, let me put it another way. 
To your knowledge has the Salt Bowl Company 
or Mr. Papworth ever been charged with a vio-
lation of any local, county, state, or federal law 
of any kind in his operation of the Salt Bowl? 
A. Not to my knowledge, they have not." 
Mr. Hugh C. Bringhurst, the Director of Expositions 
of the State Fair, testified as to the negotiating of the 
lease in the summer of 1967, (Tr. 122, Ln. 15-30) that 
in his capacity he was "more or less the landlord" on 
behalf of the state (Tr. 123, Ln. 27-28), that the Respon-
dent had been a "good tenant", (Tr. 124, Ln. 10) "a very 
good tenant" and had "been very cooperative", (Tr. 124, 
Ln. 12-13). Mr. Bringhurst testified that the race sched-
uled for September 4, 1972, was cancelled because of rain 
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and that Mr. Papworth requested permission to change 
the race to September 6th, which permission was granted 
by Mr. Bringhurst. Mr. Bringhurst testified to receipt 
of the notice of renewal (Tr. 125, Ln. 8-30). 
Notwithstanding the Respondent's performance of 
its lease according to its terms, Mr. Bringhurst testified 
as to a conversation had between himself and Mr. Frank 
Nelson of the office of the Attorney General which con-
versation gave rise to the first "Notice of Violation", Ex-
hibit P-3. Mr. Bringhurst testified to his conversation 
with Mr. Nelson as follows (Tr. 127, Ln. 2 to Tr. 128, 
Ln. 23): 
"Q. Would you tell us the substance of that 
telephone conversation or, first, do you know 
when it took place? 
A. It was just before I wrote that letter. I'm 
not definite on the dates. 
Q. The letter is dated May 10. Was your tele-
phone call on that date? 
A. Could have been, yes. 
Q. Would you state the substance of that con-
versation, just what was said? 
A. Well, we were just talking as to — said we 
could find reasons for not having the race and 
for cancelling the contract and to write the letter 
and I would pick up a letter from him that morn-
ing. 
Q. What did he say concerning reasons? 
A. That there was reasons to cancel the con-
tract, and I could pick the letter up that morn-
ing. 
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Q. Was there any more discussion than that? 
A. Well, just conversation about the races and 
so forth. 
Q. Well, what was said about the races by your-
self and by Mr. Nelson? What did he say, and 
what did you say? 
A. Well, I said there was a contract, and / could 
see no reason to cancel the contract, and he said, 
"whoever prepared that contract was not too 
good at doing contracts", words to that effect. 
Q. Did you — did I understand you to say that 
you said you didn't know of any reason to can-
cel it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was his response to that? 
A. Well, he said there was. 
Q. Did he tell you what it was? 
A. Well, he said one reason, the Governor didn't 
want any races. 
Q. Do you recall the taking of your deposition 
at the office of the attorney general on July 18, 
1973? 
A. Yes. 
MR. HOBBS: On page 8 at line 17, Counsel. 
Q. Do you recall being asked these questions 
and making these answers: 
Question, "Did you have any objection to 
the lease being cancelled?" 
Answer, "Well, I could not see any reason 
for the lease being cancelled in my opinion." 
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Question, "Did you express that opinion to 
Mr. Nelson?" 
Answer, "Yes." 
Question, "What did he say?" 
Answer, "Well, he said that was, as I recall, 
was something like 'nothing to do with me. We 
are going to cancel the lease.'" 
A. That's right. 
Q. Were you asked those questions and made 
those answers? 
A. Yes." (Emphasis added.) 
Further, on cross examination, Mr. Bringhurst was 
questioned concerning the supposed reasons for cancella-
tion ol the Respondent's lease and replied as follows (Tr. 
130, Ln. 19 to 25): 
Q. Did he talk to you at that time about what 
reasons he was going to put in the letter? 
A. Well, as I understood it, he was searching 
out to find the reasons to put in the letter, and 
we had discussed — I couldn't see why we should 
cancel it on the grounds that all he had to do 
was write a letter to renew it and — in fact, I 
didn't get the letter until quite a while later. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Mr. Frank Nelson, of the Attorney General's office testi-
fied to the writing of a letter concurrently with his in-
structions to Mr. Bringhurst to give notice of cancellation, 
said letter being Exhibit 12 P and addressed to Mr. Mil-
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ton Weilenmann, concurrently with his instructions to 
Mr. Bringhurst to give Mr. Papworth his first "Notice 
of Violation", (Ex. 3 P) as follows: 
Q. But it doesn't say anything about any 
specific violation? 
A. No, it does not. 
Q. The Exhibit 12-P, the letter you wrote on 
May 10, what I am really getting at makes no 
reference to the changing of that date from the 
4th to the 6th of September, does it? 
A. No, it does not. 
Q. In fact, you did not even know about that 
when you wrote that letter, did you? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You learned it later? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So that you were prepared to cancel the 
plaintiff's lease before you ever knew that he 
had changed that date from the 4th to the 6th? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And then when it was learned that he had 
changed the date from the 4th to the 6th, he was 
given a notice citing that as a reason. Is that 
correct? 
A. Yes, as one of the reasons. This was later 
information. We thought we had sufficient 
grounds before that time, but that was an addi-
tional reason. (Emphasis added.) 
Further, Mr. Nelson admitted a lack of knowledge of any 
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legal violation,, (Tr. 147, Ln. 6-10). Again, Mr. Nelson 
testified (Tr. 148, Ln. 14-17): his answer, 
"A. Yes. I might qualify that to say that per-
haps there was a violation in racing on a date 
other than was approved, but again I'm not even 
sure that I had that information at the time 
that this particular letter was written.,, 
Respondent has no particular argument with the 
citations of authorities cited by Appellant in its Argu-
ment on this point other than to observe that each 
of them completely begs the ultimate question. It would 
appear from the Appellant's argument that it was ex-
tremely concerned about zoning variances or the lack of 
them, possible future violations of law, etc., when, in 
fact, the evidence demonstrates that these were all after-
thoughts, searched out to justify the capricious and arbi-
trary actions of the Appellant. In conclusion it should 
be noted that the Respondent did not need a variance 
from the city as a condition of operating its race track 
and running a race under its contract, and if Respondent 
had been accused of a violation of law, which it never 
has been except in Appellant's brief, it was entitled to 
due process, its "day in Court" under the terms of the 
contract. Further^ it was apparent that the Appelant 
was "out to get" the Respondent even before it was 
aware of the change of date of the previous Labor Day 
race, which change of date was with the Appellant's con-
sent (Tr. 104, Ln. 10-14). It is submitted that the claimed 
violation only became important when the Appellant re-
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alized that it was about to be called to account for its 
high-handed dealings with the Respondent. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE 
NOTICE OF VIOLATION SERVED MAY 12, 
1973, WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE TERMS 
OF THE LEASE. 
Again the Appellant reiterates the proposition that 
the Respondent had violated a Salt Lake City zoning 
ordinance despite the record. On page 13 of its Brief the 
Appellant states, 
"On the 6th day of September, 1972 . . . the Re-
spondent conducted races which violated the 
'noise control' ordinance." 
This statement is not supported by the record, or by the 
findings of the Court. If there was a violation, which 
can only be supposition, the respondent was never 
charged or convicted "by any Court having jurisdiction," 
and again it is submitted that the claimed violation is 
an afterthought and justification for action which had 
already been taken by the Appellant. The Court com-
menting on the injection of this issue into the trial pro-
ceedings observed to counsel for the Appellant (Tr. 186, 
Ln. 22-30). 
"Your evidence of violation on the sixth was 
weak, awfully weak. However, as a matter of 
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fact, I think you could find a violation or a non-
violation — as far as that letter is concerned, that 
is hearsay, and I admitted that on the basis of 
notice of not granting a variance, as I recall. 
It did not go to the truthfulness of what was 
stated therein as to violation or as to maximum 
amount of noise that the race track did make." 
Appellant attempts to make much of the fact that the 
Respondent had conducted various tests to insure that 
he would be able to comply with any restrictions placed 
upon him by the city, if the proposed restrictions if in 
fact proved to be lawful when tried to a "Court having 
jurisdiction". Mr. Fapworth explained under direct ex-
amination (Tr. 168, Ln. 4-8): 
A. Well, I don't really remember that he said 
anything of that nature. I mentioned afterwards 
to I think the President that we would have to 
make some changes in our operation, that we 
were going to try to live with the ordinance and 
do our best to comply with it, and I think that 
came out in the paper the next day. 
Q. Now, why did you say that? 
A. Because they hadn't granted the variance, 
and we were going to proceed and do whatever 
we had to do to comply with it. 
Q. Does this imply that under the ordinance 
that the decibel would have been above— 
A. Not necessarily. 
Q. — the ordinance? 
A. We don't know. 
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The record is clear that while Mr. Papworth felt that 
he was operating lawfully and would be able to operate 
within the proposed ordinance, he was taking every 
precaution to make sure that any modification necessary 
under the law would be made. To forestall the Respon-
dent's attempts to continue (as he had for twenty (20) 
years) a lawful operation, the Appellant caused to be 
served upon the Respondent a notice that his contract 
was cancelled (Ex. 3-P). This notice stated no reason 
for the cancellation for the simple reason that is shown 
in the preceding argument that at that point the Appel-
lant knew of no reason. 
Two days later, on May 12, 1973, after learning that 
the Respondent had changed the race schedule for a 
preceding September 4, 1972, to September 6, which 
change was with the express permission of the State, 
seized upon this meager straw to serve a second "notice 
of violation" (Ex. 4-P) which stated: 
"Said termination to be effective on the 6th day 
after service of this notice since there is no way 
in which the violation can be corrected within the 
said period of time." 
The Appellant urges that the Lease Agreement provides 
two methods of termination. Respondent disagrees with 
this interpretation, and contends that a plain reading of 
the contract indicates only one method of termination 
in the event that it is claimed that Respondent's activS-
ties on the leased premises were unlawful, and that is thait 
this matter be determined by a Court having jurisdiction 
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prior to such termination. It appears obvious that the 
method of cancellation provided by panagraphs 9 and 
16 contemplates a nonpayment of rent or any other vio-
lation of the terms of the Lease whidi do not constitute 
an unlawful act, but merely noncompliance. Squarely in 
point is the observation ait 49 Am. Jur. 2d pg. 1008 at 
par. 1043, "illegal use" where it is stated: 
" past use by a Lessee of the premises for an 
illegal purpose does not, when such use has been 
discontinued, justify the Lessor in summarily 
removing the tenant on any theory of the right 
to abate a public nuisance. So it is held that the 
discontinuance of an illegal use prior to the in-
stitution of proceedings by the Lessor to oust 
the tenant, is a good defense to such proceed-
ings, although it is otherwise with regard to a 
discontinuance after the ouster proceedings are 
instituted . . . also, where the landlord with 
knowledge of the tenant's illegal use of the prem-
ises does not base his right to oust the tenant 
on such fact, he cannot, as an afterthought, base 
his act in ousting the tenant for other reasons, 
upon the ground that the tenant was using the 
premises for an illegal purpose." (Emphasis 
added.) 
This observation treats precisely what the Appellant at-
tempted to do, i.e. to justify its wrongful action by seek-
ing out a spurious reason as an afterthought. 
The case of Gerard vs. Young, 20 Utah 2nd 30, 342 
Pacific 2nd 343(1967), cited by the Appellant as author-
ity for its actions is so far removed from the facts of the 
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instant case as to be of no authority whatever. In Gerard, 
the Lessee was accused of illegal use of the premises in 
allowing gambling, and responded by resorting to the 
Fifth Amendment. That situation has nothing to do 
with the instant case, where no violation of law has ever 
been alleged or proven, and the Respondent has demon-
strated throughout the record his good faith efforts to 
comply with the law in every respect. 
Further, with reference to the claim of forfeiture by 
reason of an illegal or unlawful use, the case of Murphy 
vs. Traynor, 135 P&c. 2d 145, 230 at 232 (Colo.), and the 
cases cited therein are in pertinent point. In thait case, as 
in this, a Lessee had entered into a lease, agreeing to make 
substantial improvements. He had also agreed as in the 
instant case, that he would use the premises for certain 
specified purposes only, and would not violate any Fed-
eral,, State or Local laws. The premises were operated 
as a liquor store and the Lessee was convicted, along with 
an employee, of a sale of liquor to a minor. The Lessor 
claimed a forfeiture under the terms of the contract 
and brought suit to regain possession. The Court directed 
a verdict in favor of the Lessee which was affirmed on 
appeal. The Court, after observing that the law looks 
with disfavor upon forfeitures, stating: 
"If the contracting parties had the purpose of 
working a forfeiture upon a solitary conviction 
for violation of the liquor law, they must say 
so in plain words." 
In the instant case, Respondent has not even been 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
afforded the "solitary cxmvictoon", even though the nego-
tiations and agreement of the parties clearly amitemplated 
this. 
In connection with the claim of a violation by the 
Respondent on September 6, 1972, Mr. Nelson testified 
that he did not know of the change in schedule from Sep-
tember 4th to September Gth or of any claimed viola-
tion when he wrote the Department of Development Ser-
vices (Exhibit 12-P) and when he directed the Director 
of the Division of Expositions (Exhibit 3-P) to cancel 
the Plaintiff's lease. It was only after this action had 
been taken that the change of schedule came to Mr. 
Nelson's attention and this claimed violation was seized 
upon (Exhibit 4-P) to send a further notice of termina-
tion. Even assuming, for the purpose of argument, that 
there had been a violation on September 6th, it would 
have been the only violation in a period of approximately 
20 years in connection with the Plaintiff's use of the leased 
premises. 
In concluding its argument on this point the Appel-
lant states at page 14 of its Brief, with reference to Ex-
hibit 4-P, the "notice of violation" dated May 11, 1973, 
and served May 12: 
"This 'notice of violation' gave the Respondent 
five days to cure . . ." 
This statement is simply not a true statement of the 
facts and an examination of Exhibit 4-P will show on 
its face that it states, not that there are five days to 
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cure but that there is "no way" to cure the claimed vio-
lation. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAM-
AGES TO THE RESPONDENT BASED ON 
ACTIONS OF THE APPELLANT WHICH 
WERE IN HARMONY WITH THE LEASE 
AGREEMENT AND NON ACTION ON THE 
PART OF RESPONDENT WHO FAILED TO 
EITHER CURE OR CHALLENGE THE NO-
TICE OF VIOLATION. 
The Appellant's argument on this point retreats some-
what from the claimed "violation" argument and instead 
argues a "reasonable belief of violation" inteipretation 
of the lease (Ex. P-l). It is submitted that the lease by 
its terms does not justify any such construction, when 
it plainly and without ambiguity states that (Ex. P-l, 
page 6, Par. 13): 
"In the event Lessee's activities upon the leased 
premises are deteraiinied by any Court having 
jurisdiction to be unlawful . . . " (Emphasis 
added.) 
It is further submitted that, not only does the lease agree-
ment fail to justify the actions of the Appellant if based 
on a reasonable belief, but that the record amply shows 
that the Appellant in fact had no such belief of a viola-
tion at all, other than as an excuse or afterthought to 
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justify the actions which it had already determined it 
would take. 
Further, Appellant deplores the fact that after re-
ceiving the "Notice of Violation" that Respondent "did 
nothing". The Respondent, in fact, repeatedly attempted 
to have his lease honored by the Appellant according to 
its teams. First it should be noted that the Respondent 
did not have continuous possession of the leased prem-
ises, but entered only on scheduled racing nights and 
with the permission of the Appellant by its agents. As 
stated by Mr. Papworth (Tr. 104, Ln. 30, to Tr. 105, Ln. 
11): 
Q. (By Mr. Hobbs) Now, Mr. Papworth, un-
der your lease agreement how did you operate? 
Did you have permanent quarters there on the 
Fairgrounds? 
A. No. We had access to the area on our sched-
uled night, and that's the only time we had ac-
cess to it. 
Q. And you weren't in continuous possession of 
the property? 
A. Not at all. 
Q. You were allowed in on your race nights? 
A. Yes. On race nights the employees would 
come over and unlock the facilities so we could 
use them. 
Q. And then when you finished using them, you 
would leave and they would lock them up again? 
A. That is correct. 
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The situation as described by Mr. Bringhurst (Tr. 137, 
Ln. 11-20): 
Q. Under Mr. Papworth's arrangement, the Salt 
Bowl Company's arrangement, you and your em-
ployees controlled the physical access to the 
grounds, did you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You opened the gates, unlocked them and 
let people in when it was their time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And let them out and locked the gates when 
they were through? 
A. Yes* 
Mr. Papworth was aware of the contemplated action of 
Salt Lake City and its proposed noise ordinance and made 
preparations, both to attempt to comply with the ordi-
nance as well as to test its validity and legality, as he 
was entitled to do under the terms of his lease and to a 
Court having jurisdiction. In the words of Mr. Bring-
hurat (Tr. 136, Ln. 1-12). 
Q. And he did intend to contest it in the court? 
A. That is the understanding I had. 
Q. As well as attempt to comply with it? 
A. Yes. We discussed other ways to comply 
with it, building a fence along the north side with 
burlap on it to control the noise, but it was so 
low that we didn't think that was feasible either. 
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Q. But Mr. Papworth did devote quite a bit of 
time and thought to complying with this ordi-
nance? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As well as contesting it? 
A. Yes. 
As to the claim that Mr. Papworth did nothing following 
the notice of violation, it is again submitted that the 
record does not support this contention and in fact com-
pletely controverts it. Mr. Papworth repeatedly re-
quested that the Appellant reinstate the contract and 
allow him access to the promises. And, as he stated (Tr. 
Il l , Ln. 25, Tr. 112, Ln. 5): 
A. Well, I state again I had a contract. If they 
would reinstate it, I would go out and race from 
now on. 
Q. What were the conditions in the reinstate-
ment? 
A. All they had to do was withdraw their no-
tice of violation, and I would have a valid con-
tract, and I would go out and race and take my 
chances on living within any laws that anybody 
had. 
Q. Well, did they specifically tell you what you 
would need to do before they could reinstate the 
contract? 
A. No. All they stated was that they couldn't 
reinstate the contract. 
Again Mr. Papworth in referring to a conversation had 
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between himself and Mr. Gibbs of the Attorney Gen-
eral's office testified (Tr. 173, Ln. 19-27): 
A. Well, my position, if you will let me explain 
it, and I explained to Mr. Bringhurst, who is the 
man I was dealing with from the very first day 
that this occurred, Mr. Gibbs called and said, 
"What can we do? Let's get this thing resolved. 
Let's get some racing going. What do we have 
to do to get out of this predicament?" 
And I said, "Reinstate my lease. Let me go race 
and fight my battle with the City. If I violate 
the ordinance, let me see if I am right or wrong, 
and you stay out of it . . ." 
Thus it would appear that it was not Mr. P&pworth or 
the Respondent that was "doing nothing" but rather it 
was the Appellant who refused to honor the lease ac-
cording to its terms or to grant the Respondent access 
to the leased premises. It is obvious that the Respon-
dent did not wish to go upon the premises as a trespasser 
or as an invitee but only (as he was entitled to do) as 
a Lessee with a valid and subsisting lease which he had 
in no way violated and which he was entitled to have 
honored by the Appellant. Appellant's argument of "rea-
sonable belief of a violation" is not only specious, but 
completely negates the standards for cancellation as 
specifically set out in the lease and in the dealings of the 
parties over the previous twenty years. 
POINT I. ON CROSS APPEAL 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS 
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DETERMINATION THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF'S DAMAGES ARE LIMITED TO SIX 
RACES IN 1973 AND THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF'S DAMAGES WERE TERMINATED 
BY REASON OF THE DEFENDANT'S LET-
TER OF JUNE 11, 1973, ADVISING THE 
PLAINTIFF THAT IT SHOULD CONDUCT 
A RACE. 
Following the cancellation of the Respondent's lease, 
the Respondent on June 8, 1973, filed its claim for dam-
ages (Exhibit 13-P). In immediate response to the Re-
spondent's claim,, the Appellant by Mr. Robert B. Han-
son, wrote a letter on June 11, 1973, (Exhibit 21-D) in-
viting the Respondent inter alia "We propose that you 
conduct race and see whether you are correct." Obviously 
this did not constitute a reinstatement of the Respon-
dent's lease or any concession that the lease was valid 
but merely stated that he could come run "a race". As 
to who would "see whether you are correct" the letter 
is unclear but apparently the Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral was to be the judge and jury, i.e. the "Court of com-
petent jurisdiction" contemplated by the agreement of 
the parties. 
Of course Mr. Papworth refused to concede to tins 
position and instead reiterated his right to have his lease 
agreement honored. At a meeting shortly subsequent in 
the chambers of the District Court, a conversation was 
held between Mr. Hanson of the Attorney General's Of-
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fice and Mr. Papworth, which Mr. Papworth described 
as follows (Tr. 120, Ln. 25 to Tr. 121, Ln. 9): 
A, Yes. I believe on July 11 over in the new 
county (x>urthouse building, at that time we were 
appearing in Judge Baldwin's court, and Mr. 
Hanson of the Attorney General's office had 
stated in court that we were invited to race, at 
which time the judge asked us to go talk it over. 
We went out in the hall, and at that time I in-
formed Mr. Hanson again that if he would rein-
state the contract — this was on July 11 — and 
pay damages that I had suffered up to this date, 
we would certainly go race. 
Q. And what was Mr. Hanson's response to 
ttot? 
A. Well, Mr. Hanson said he couldn't reinstate 
the contract, that if we wanted to go out and 
hold a race, that we had their permission; but 
again I told him that we wouldn't do anything 
until we had a firm contract, that our original 
contract was back in force. (Emphasis added.) 
Actually this conversation took place on July 17,1973 
(Tr. 121, Ln. 15). Mr. Papworth further explained his 
portion (Tr. 172, Ln. 30 to Tr. 173, Ln. 2). 
A. Well, I was told to go out and try a race, 
and my reply was that "You reinstate my con-
tract, and I will go out and race." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Again, the question occurs, try it to whom? A Court of 
competent jurisdiction? Obviously the answer is to try 
it to the whims of the Attorney General's Office, who had 
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already prejudged the case. Indeed the present position 
of the Appellant is quite contrary to the action of the 
Appellant in negotiating a contract on behalf of the 
state with unrelated third parties, the Salt Lake Valley 
Racing Association, in the latter part of July and the first 
week in August of 1973 (Tr. 181, Ln. 3-8, Tr. 183, Ln. 1). 
While this contract was never executed it was neverthe-
less drafted and submitted to the Division of Expositions, 
by and with the approval of Mr. Hanson and in complete 
derogation of the rights of the Respondent, and in com-
plete rontradiction to the position taken by the Appellant 
in his present argument, that the Respondent could race 
"anytime he wanted". Referring to the drafting of the 
contract with third parties (Tr. 183, Ln. 18-22), Mr. Han-
son testified: 
Q. (By Mr. Hobbs) It was drafted? 
A. It was drafted. A proposed contract was 
submitted to the Division of Expositions. 
Q. With your approval? 
A. With my approval. 
It is submitted that such conduct on the part of the Ap-
pellant as described above, did not terminate or limit the 
Respondent's right to damages but in fact if anything 
proved the ongoing nature of such damages. 
POINT II. ON CROSS APPEAL 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS 
DETERMINATION THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
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WAS UNDER A DUTY TO MITIGATE ITS 
DAMAGES BY REASON OF THE LETTER 
WRITTEN BY THE DEFENDANT ON JUNE 
11* 1974. 
It appears that the trial court considered Mr. Han-
son's letter of June 11, (Ex. 21-D) in response to the 
Respondent's claim for damages (which letter incidentally 
appears to be completely self serving) constituted some 
sort of reinstatement of the Respondent's rights under 
the lease agreement and an invitation that "all is for-
given" and that he could come back and conduct his 
automobile events as in the past. As is shown by the 
previous argument this simply was not the fact. It was 
an invitation to run "a race" — and nothing more — 
as a sort of trial to be conducted and determined by the 
prosecutor. Mr. Fapworth attempted to explain this to 
Mr. Hanson, inter alia (Tr. 224, Ln. 12-23). 
WITNESS: He invited us to go out and race, 
and I said that I would be happy to if he would 
reinstate our contract. I didn't want to go out 
and hold one race — in fact, it would be impossi-
ble because at that time the drivers were running 
in Springville, and the only way — 
THE COURT: Just — you are not responsive 
to the question. Just tell us what was said. 
WITNESS: Oh. 
Q. (By Mr. Hobbs) Did you tell Mr. Hanson 
these things that you are telling us? 
A. Yes. 
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THE COURT: All right. 
A. And I said that if he would reinstate the 
contract, I would see if I could get the drivers to 
come back and support me for the balance of 
the season, and he refused to reinstate it. 
And again Mr. Papworth testified (Tr. 225 ,Ln. 7-20) : 
A. I told him if he would reinstate the contract, 
we would go out and race and, if necessary, go 
into court and test the noise law, but we wanted 
to go out and be able to finish the season. 
Q. And did you at that time explain to Mr. 
Hanson any of the difficulties you had in start-
ing up the season? 
A. Yes. Racing is like — 
Q. Just tell us what you told Mr. Hanson. 
A. Well, as I recall, I told him that we plan 
ahead for several months and get ready and 
have the schedule set for the season. We have 
point system for the season, and many things 
enter into it that the drivers look forward to, 
not for one race but for the season as a whole, 
special events and things of this nature. 
The record is clear that the letter of June 11 was in no 
sense a reinstatement of the contract; and Mr. Hanson 
on repeated subsequent occasions refused to consider it 
as such. Under these circumstances it is difficult to see 
how the Respondent was in any position to even attempt 
to mitigate his damages. The premises were in physical 
control of the Appellant, and the Respondent had been 
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told unequivocally and repeatedly that there was "no 
way" that his contract would be reinstated. 
It is submitted that the doctrine of mitigation, or the 
doctrine of avoidable consequences, does not require that 
a Lessee with contract rights under his lease enter upon 
premises wrongfully withheld from him by trespass or as 
an invitee. The doctrine is stated at 22 Am. Jur. 2nd 
P. 53, Damages, Par. 32 as follows: 
32. Nature and extent of the doctrine. 
Under the doctrine of avoidable consequences, 
the injured person need not make extraordinary 
efforts or do what is unreasonable or imprac-
ticable in his efforts to minimize damages; rea-
sonable diligence and ordinary care are all that 
is required to allow full recovery of all dam-
ages caused by the defendant's wrongful activity. 
More completely stated, the consequences of an 
injury are recoverable where the injured party 
acts with such care and diligence as a man of 
ordinary prudence would under the circum-
stances, and his efforts to minimize damages are 
determined by the rules of common sense, good 
faith, and fair dealing. (Emphasis added.) 
See also 22 Am. Jur. 2d P. 56, Damages, Part. 33: 
33. Generally. 
. . . the innocent party is not required to take ex-
traordinary efforts to avoid the losses from the 
breach of contract nor is he expected to incur 
risks or spend substantial sums of money to 
protect the defaulter. Nor need he sacrifice a 
substantial right of his own in order to minimize 
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his loss. All that is required of the nondefault-
ing party — in measuring his damages — is that 
he act reasonably so as not unduly to enhance 
the damages caused by the breach. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Further, it should be noted that Mr. Fapworth's testi-
mony concerning the various conversations with the 
agents of the Appellant, his efforts to comply in every 
respect with the terms of his lease, and his attempts sub-
sequent to the action taken by the Appellant to obtain 
a reinstatement of his lease, are each completely uncon-
tradicted in any respect by any of the testimony of Ap-
pellant's witnesses. 
See Peterson vs. Piatt, 400 P. 2d 507, 16 Utah 2d 
330. See also Coidos vs. Desimone, 208 P. 2d 105 (Wash-
ington). See also 163 S. E. 2d 273 (Kentucky) wherein 
it is stated: 
"To evict a tenant is to deprive him of the pos-
session of the leased premises or disturb him in 
their beneficial enjoyment so as to cause the 
tenant to abandon the premises. This amounts 
to a constructive eviction. It is not necessary 
that there should have been an actual, physical 
eviction or even a lawsuit. There is an eviction 
if the acts of the landlord are such as will justify 
or warrant the tenant in leaving the premises 
and he does in fact abandon them." 
CONCLUSION 
The court correctly determined that the notice of 
violation served upon the Respondent by the Appellant 
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was not justified under the facts and cireumsttances as 
they existed at the time, and that the Respondent was 
entitled to the benefits of his lease agreement and the 
renewal thereof. The facts demonstrate that the notice 
of violation was not justified either by the existing facte 
or by the terms and conditions of the lease agreement. 
The attempt of the Appellant to interject into these pro-
ceedings an issue completely outside the scope of this 
litigation, an issue which if it had any merit at all which 
the Respondent denies, should have been a matter of 
litigation between the Respondent and Salt Lake City, 
and a matter which had nothing whatever to do with the 
State of Utah was without merit. If the Appellant de-
sired to terminate the Respondent's activities it had avail-
able to it the remedy of condemnation or negotiation, 
rather than a resort to bullying tactics followed by lame 
excuses in attempted jiistificaition. 
The method by which the court arrived at the Re-
spondent's damages for each of its cancelled events is not 
questioned by the Respondent, nor so far as appears from 
the record at this point, by the Appellant. However it 
was error for the court to limit the Respondent's damages 
to the short period of time between the cancellation of 
the Respondent's lease and Respondent's invitation to 
return and "try a race" — a period of approximately six 
weeks — when the record clearly shows that the acts and 
intent of the Appellant both before and after this date, 
June 11, 1973, were quite contrary to its now claimed 
invitation." The determination of the trial court find-
ing the Appellant liable for the breach of the Respon-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
33 
dent's lease should be affirmed, and the court's finding 
limiting the Respondent's damages to the period ol May 
12 to June 16 should be reversed as insufficient as a mat-
ter of law, and the case remanded for further proceedings 
for the determination of the Respondent's damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEE W. HOBBS 
Attorney for Respondent 
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